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Abstract
When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist — borrow or sell assets. We compare
the welfare properties of these options in two economies: in one, agents can borrow (issue inside
bonds) and in the other they can sell government bonds (outside bonds). All transactions
are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any
allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds
and that the converse is not true. Moreover, under best policies, the allocation with outside
bonds strictly Pareto dominates the allocation with inside bonds.
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1 Introduction
In monetary economies, agents often face binding liquidity constraints. In such situations, they
can acquire additional liquidity by borrowing or selling assets. Several papers have studied the
case where agents can sell nominal government bonds (outside bonds) for money while others
allow agents to borrow money (issue inside bonds).1 These diﬀerent methods for relaxing liquidity
constraints raise the following questions: First, following the logic of Modigliani-Miller, do these
alternative arrangements lead to equivalent allocations? Second, what is the optimal monetary
policy in each case? Third, under optimal policies, is one preferred to another? Our focus in this
paper is to address these questions.
Within a common monetary framework, we consider two economies: one in which agents trade
government bonds and one in which they trade inside bonds. We first show that for any positive
inflation rate, bond trades improve the allocation in both economies.2 With regard to the first
question, for suﬃciently high inflation rates, we find that a Modigliani-Miller type result holds
— the allocations in the two economies are the same. With regard to the second question, the
optimal policy for the inside bond economy involves a strictly positive rate of inflation while in the
outside bond economy the optimal policy requires the bonds/money ratio and the inflation rate to
be arbitrarily close to zero. Finally, under the optimal policies, the allocation with outside bonds
generates higher welfare than the allocation with inside bonds.
We prove these results in a general equilibrium monetary model in the spirit of Lagos and
Wright (2005) with fiat money and one-period bonds. As in Kocherlakota (2003), to make a fair
comparison across economies we assume that all trades must be voluntary.3 This implies that the
government cannot use lump-sum taxes to redeem outstanding government debt and that, in the
inside bond economy, redemption of inside bonds must be voluntary. Our results suggest a direct
link between Modigliani-Miller type equivalence results and the ability to collect taxes and/or debt.
1Examples of the first method include Kocherlakota (2003), Shi (2005, 2007), Boel and Camera (2007) and
Marchesi and Senesi (2007). Examples of the latter include Aiyagari and Williamson (2000), Aykol (2004), Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2007), and Diaz and Perrera-Tallo (2007).
2The basic mechanism for improving the allocation in both models is the same — agents are able to trade idle
cash balances for interest bearing assets. This raises the demand for money and thus its real value in equilibrium.
3 In a recent paper, Kocherlakota (2007) emphasizes that many results in the literature rely on asymmetric
collection powers of private and government entities. To eliminate this asymmetry, he assumes equal and positive
collection powers for both type of agents. We eliminate it by assuming that neither has any collection power. With
this assumption we are ensuring that any diﬀerences in allocations that arise are not the result of inherent diﬀerences
in the collection powers across public and private entities.
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Under optimal policies, the allocations are equivalent in the two economies if the constraint on the
ability to collect debt in the inside bond economy does not bind.
Our equivalence result for high inflation economies is reminiscent of Wallace’s (1981) Modigliani-
Miller type result for open market operations. In an overlapping generation model, Wallace shows
that the composition of a government’s debt portfolio - consisting of fiat money and capital -
does not aﬀect the equilibrium allocation. An crucial element for proving his result is that the
government has access to lump-sum taxation. Our equivalence result is also related to a recent
paper by Kocherlakota (2007). He considers various models of asset trade. In these models, agents
can trade a privately issued one-period bond, a publicly issued one-period bond, or a publicly
issued money. He proves that the allocations for these economies are equivalent.4 As noted by
Kocherlakota, it is crucial for these results to hold that the government has access to lump-sum
taxes and private lenders can force some repayment of loans. The same is true in our model, if the
government has access to lump-sum taxation and private lenders can force repayment, then given
an equilibrium in one of these economies, it is possible to pick policy in the other economy that
generates an outcome-equivalent equilibrium.5
Several further papers are related to what we do here. Kehoe and Levine (2001) compare
allocations in a dynamic economy when agents can acquire consumption goods in one case by
selling their capital holdings and in another case by issuing debt subject to a borrowing constraint.
They show that if agents are suﬃciently patient, the allocations are the same in a deterministic
environment, but if they are suﬃciently impatient, then the debt constrained allocation leads to
a better allocation. However, they study trade in real assets while we analyze trade in nominal
assets. Furthermore, they do not examine government policy in their economies whereas we do. Shi
(2007) examines the implications of illiquid bonds in a monetary search model where there are legal
restrictions preventing bonds from being used as a medium of exchange in some transactions but not
in others. The legal restrictions make outside bonds illiquid relative to money. He finds that having
illiquid bonds can be welfare improving. In Boel and Camera (2006), bonds are illiquid in the sense
that there is a transaction fee for converting them into cash. Since agents have diﬀerent discount
factors and trading opportunities, for some parameter configurations, there is a welfare improving
4 In an earlier paper, Taub (1994) derived a related equivalence result between money and credit.
5 In Kocherlakota’s model money plays no transaction role. In contrast, we show that this equivalence result holds
when money is a medium of exchange and bonds are not.
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role for illiquid bonds under the optimal monetary policy. Marchesiani and Senesi (2007) consider
an economy where agents with idle money holdings can buy illiquid outside bonds. The government
finances the interest payment through lump-sum taxes. They show that the opportunity to buy
interest bearing bonds is strictly welfare improving because it allows agents with idle money to save.
Lagos and Rocheteau (2003) study the use of illiquid bonds in a variant of the Lagos-Wright model.
They find that under the optimal monetary policy (zero inflation) illiquid bonds are inessential.6
Finally, the paper is also related to Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a, 1999b), who study the relation
between inside and outside money. Their model is related to ours since some buyers are able to
relax their cash constraint by issuing personal liabilities to sellers which improves the allocation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the environment. Section
3 contains an analysis of the economy with outside bonds. Section 4 examines the economy with
inside bonds, and Section 5 compares the allocations of the two economies. Section 6 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The environment
The basic framework we use is the divisible money model developed in Lagos and Wright (2005).
This model is useful because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous preferences for consumption
and production while still keeping the distribution of money balances analytically tractable.7 Time
is discrete, and in each period there are three perfectly competitive markets that open sequentially.
There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents and one perishable good produced and consumed
by all agents.
The timing of the model is as follows. The first market is a financial market where agents trade
money for bonds as in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). The second market is a goods market
where agents trade money for market 2 goods. In the third market, all agents can produce and
consume market 3 goods and readjust their portfolios.
At the beginning of the first market, agents get a preference shock that determines whether
6Furthermore, there are a number of papers that study the coexistence of money and bonds (e.g. Diaz-Perrera-
Tallo (2007), Ferris and Watanabe (2007), Sun (2007), and Telyukova and Wright (2007)). The key diﬀerence to our
work is that they never compare the allocative eﬀects of diﬀerent bonds.
7An alternative framework would be Shi (1997) which we could amend with preference and technology shocks to
generate the same results.
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they can produce or consume in the second market. With probability 1−n, an agent can consume
and cannot produce. We refer to these agents as buyers. With probability n, an agent can produce
and cannot consume. These are sellers. Moreover, buyers receive an idiosyncratic preference shock
to utility. They also learn that they will get utility εu(q) from q consumption in the second market,
where u0(q), −u00(q) > 0. The shock ε has a continuous distribution F (ε) with support [0, εH ], is
iid across buyers, serially uncorrelated and has the expected value ε¯ =
R εH
0 εdF (ε).
8 Producers in
the second market incur a utility cost c(q) = q from producing q units of output. All trades in
market 2 are anonymous, and agents’ trading histories in this market are private information, thus
no trade credit exists. Hence, there is a role for money, as sellers require immediate compensation
for their production eﬀort.
Following Lagos and Wright (2005), we assume that agents receive utility U(x) from x con-
sumption, with U 0(x),−U 00(x) > 0, U 0(0) = ∞, and U 0(+∞) = 0. They can also produce these
goods with a constant returns to scale production technology where one unit of the consumption
good is produced with one unit of labor h generating one unit of disutility.9 The discount factor
across periods is β.
2.1 First-best allocation
The expected steady state lifetime utility of the representative agent at the beginning of the period
before types are realized is
(1− β)W =
Z εH
0
[(1− n) εu (qε)− nqs] dF (ε) + U (x)− h. (1)
where qε is consumption and qs production in market 2. We use (1) as our welfare criteria.
To derive the welfare maximizing quantities, we assume that all agents are treated symmetri-
cally. The planner then maximizes (1) subject to the feasibility constraint
Q ≡ (1− n)
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) = nqs. (2)
8All of our results go through with a non-zero lower bound. Setting the lower bound of ε to zero simplifies the
presentation of the results.
9As in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions allow us to get a degenerate distribution of money holdings
at the beginning of a period. The diﬀerent utility functions U (.) and u (.) allow us to impose technical conditions
such that in equilibrium all agents produce and consume in the last market.
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where Q is aggregate consumption. The first-best allocation satisfies
U 0 (x∗) = 1 and
εu0 [q∗ (ε)] = 1 for all ε. (3)
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could force agents to produce and consume.
2.2 Outside bonds versus inside bonds
We analyze equilibria of the model under two diﬀerent bond markets — a market for outside bonds
and one for inside bonds. Outside bonds are nominal government debt obligations, whereas inside
bonds are private debt obligations. We assume that the government has a record-keeping technology
over bond trades and acts as the intermediary in the bond market. Bond holdings are book-keeping
entries — no physical object exists. This makes bonds incapable of being used as media of exchange
in market 2, hence they are illiquid as in Kocherlakota (2003). An alternative would be to assume
a legal restriction exists on the use of outside bonds as media of exchange. The government has no
record-keeping technology over goods trades. Since agents are anonymous in market 2, a buyer’s
promise to deliver outside bonds to a seller in market 3 is not credible. Consequently, fiat money
is essential for trade in market 2.
Inside bonds are financial claims on private agents, issued in a private bond market. Conse-
quently, issuing inside bonds is equivalent to receiving credit as in Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(2007). We assume that a perfectly competitive financial market exists where intermediaries have
a record-keeping technology over financial trades. The intermediaries acquire nominal debt oblig-
ations from borrowers and issue nominal debt obligations on themselves to depositors, which are
securitized by their acquired claims. Private agents are still anonymous to each other but not to
the financial intermediary.10 No record-keeping technology exists in the goods market, thus ruling
out trade credit between buyers and sellers in market 2.
In any model of credit, default is a serious issue. We consider an environment where repayment
is voluntary — creditors have no powers to collect unpaid debts. For an agent, unpaid debt has
10An example is a bank that accepts nominal deposits and makes nominal loans. While the bank knows who it
trades with, borrowers do not know the identity of depositors and vice versa.
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two consequences. First, he receives no further loans unless the debt is repaid. Second, he cannot
save by acquiring nominal debt obligations from the financial intermediary, unless he repays any
outstanding debt. Given these rules, we derive conditions to ensure voluntary redemption and show
that this may involve binding borrowing constraints, i.e., credit rationing. We assume the financial
intermediaries honor their debt obligations.
2.3 Government
In the model with outside bonds, we assume a government exists that controls the supply of fiat
currency and issues one-period nominal non-tangible bonds. These bonds are perfectly divisible,
payable to the bearer and default free.11 One bond pays oﬀ one unit of currency at maturity.
Denote Mt as the per capita money stock and Bt as the per capita stock of newly issued bonds at
the end of period t. The change in the money stock is given by
Mt −Mt−1 = τ tMt−1 +Bt−1 − ρtBt + PtGt (4)
where PtGt is the nominal amount of government spending in period t in the centralized market,
and Pt is the money price of goods in market 3.12 The total change in the money stock is comprised
of three components: first, a lump-sum transfer of cash (a ‘gift’ of cash); second, the net diﬀerence
between the cash created to redeem bonds, Bt−1, and the net cash withdrawal from selling Bt units
of bonds at the price ρt; and finally, the cash printed to pay for government goods. We assume there
are positive initial stocks of money and outside bonds M0 and B0. For τ t < 0, the government
must be able to extract money via lump-sum taxes from the economy. Throughout the paper,
we assume that τ t < 0 is not feasible because, as for the private sector, the government has no
collection power.13
To simplify the analysis, we assume Gt = 0 for all t. This implies that all money creation comes
from paying oﬀ net nominal bond obligations Bt−1−ρtBt and the lump-sum gifts of money τ tMt−1.
11The government has no incentive to default since it redeems its bonds by printing money at no cost.
12Although (4) looks like the standard government budget constraint, it is not since τ tMt−1 > 0 is a lump-sum
gift of cash that is not used to finance government spending.
13The inability to impose lump-sum taxes occurs in environments with limited enforcement. In such environments,
all trades must be voluntary, and so lump-sum taxes of money are not feasible because the government cannot impose
any penalties on the agents. If it could impose such penalties, there would be no role for money since "producers
could be forced to produce for households" (Kocherlakota 2003, p. 185).
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For the case of outside bonds, we assume that τ t = 0.14 Consequently, (4) reduces to
Mt −Mt−1 = Bt−1 − ρtBt. (5)
This allows us to focus solely on how ‘open market operations’ aﬀect the equilibrium allocation
and allows us to ignore optimal taxation issues on financing government spending. By dividing (5)
by Bt−1, we express the government budget constraint in term of the ratio of money to bonds as
follows
(γt − 1)
Mt−1
Bt−1
= 1− ρtηt (6)
where ηt ≡ Bt/Bt−1 is the gross growth rate of bonds and where γt ≡Mt/Mt−1 is the gross growth
rate of money. This equation relates the gross growth rate of money γt to the gross growth rate of
bonds ηt.
In the model with inside bonds, we assume that Bt = 0 in all periods, but the government still
controls the amount of fiat currency in the economy. In this case, agents receive lump-sum gifts of
money τ tMt−1 ≥ 0, and the money supply grows according to Mt = (1 + τ t)Mt−1 = γtMt−1.
2.4 Stationary equilibria
In period t, let φt = 1/Pt be the real price of money in market 3. For notational ease, variables
corresponding to the next period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous
period are indexed by −1. We focus on symmetric and stationary monetary equilibria where all
agents follow identical strategies and where real allocations are constant over time. In a stationary
equilibrium, end-of-period real money balances are time-invariant
φM = φ+1M+1. (7)
Moreover, we restrict our attention to equilibria where γ is time invariant which implies that
φ/φ+1 = P+1/P =M+1/M = γ.
14All our results continue to hold for τ t > 0. The case τ t < 0 is not feasible. See the previous footnote.
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3 Outside bonds
In this section, we analyze the economy with outside bonds. Let V (m, b) be the expected value
from entering market 3 with m and b units of fiat money and nominal bonds. Let qε denote the
quantities consumed by a type ε buyer, and qs the quantity produced by a seller trading in market
2. Let yj denote the quantity of outside bonds bought by an agent of type j = ε, s in market 1.
The goods price of money in market 3 is φ while p is the money price of goods in market 2. Let
a be the price of bonds in market 1, consequently the nominal interest rate earned by acquiring a
bond in this market is i = (1− a) /a, which is greater than zero if and only if a < 1. For notational
convenience we suppress the dependence of the value functions on time.
In the third market, the problem of a representative agent in period t is:
V (m, b) = max
x,h,m0,b0,q0ε,q0s,y0ε,y0s
U (x)− h
+β (1− n)
Z εH
0
£
εu(q0ε) + V
¡
m0 − a0y0ε − p0q0ε, b0 + y0ε
¢¤
dF (ε)
+βn
£
−q0s + V
¡
m0 − a0y0s + p0q0s, b0 + y0s
¢¤
subject to the sequence of constraints
x+ φm0 + φρb0 = h+ φm+ φb
pqε ≤ m− ayε 0 ≤ m− ayj 0 ≤ b+ yj
where the primes denote next period values. The first constraint is the budget constraint in market
3 while the second is the cash constraint for purchasing goods in market 2. The last two are
short-selling constraints on money and bonds in market 1.
The envelope conditions for this problem are
Vm = φ;Vb = φ. (8)
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The solution to this problem yields the following pricing relationships
p = 1/φ (9)
ρ−1 = a = (1 + i)
−1 . (10)
The first equation is simply an arbitrage condition for a seller — he can produce a unit of goods
and sell it for p units of money in market 2 or for 1/φ units of money in market 3. Since his cost
of production are linear, on the margin he must be indiﬀerent between producing in either market.
The second equation arises because there is no aggregate uncertainty as to how many buyers and
sellers there are in market 1. Consequently, arbitrage implies that the bond price has to be the
same between market 3 and market 1 in period +1.
With regards to consumption, we get U 0 (x) = 1 while there is a critical value for the taste
index ε˜ such that
ε˜u0(q˜) = 1 + i (11)
This critical buyer sells all of his bonds and spends all of money balances to acquire q˜ units of
goods. Because a buyer’s desired consumption is increasing in ε, it then follows that buyers with
ε ≥ ε˜ also sell all their bonds and consume
q˜ = φm+ φb/ (1 + i) . (12)
On the other hand, buyers with ε ≤ ε˜, either sell a portion of their bonds or, as is the case for
buyers with very low ε, buy additional bonds with some of their cash. Accordingly, a market 2
buyer’s consumption satisfies
qε =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u0−1 [(1 + i) /ε] if ε ≤ ε˜
u0−1 [(1 + i) /ε˜] if ε ≥ ε˜
(13)
With regards to market 2 production, due to linearity of the cost function and the arbitrage
condition (9) sellers are indiﬀerent as to how much they sell in market 2. Since we focus on a
symmetric equilibrium, we assume that all sellers produce the same amount.
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Given these consumption choices and the pricing conditions, we get the following bond demands:
ys ∈ [−b,m (1 + i)] if i = 0
ys = m (1 + i) if i > 0
(14)
yε ∈ [−b,m (1 + i)] if εu0 (qε) = 1 + i
yε = −b if εu0(q˜) > 1 + i.
(15)
Agents who know they will be sellers in market 2 sell all of their money for bonds if i > 0 while
those who will be buyers alter their bond holdings depending on the intensity of their desired
consumption.
Finally, the first-order condition for m0 can be written as
φ = βφ0
½
(1− n)
Z εH
0
εu0(q0ε)dF (ε) + n
¡
1 + i0
¢¾
. (16)
The cost of acquiring an additional unit of money today is φ units of goods which requires incurring
φ units of disutility from acquiring those goods. The expected future benefit from this additional
unit of money is its expected marginal utility from consuming extra goods as a buyer or from
trading it for bonds and earning 1 + i0 units of money or φ0 (1 + i0) units of utility next period.
3.1 Equilibrium
A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium consists of the agent’s decisions which meet the
following requirements: (i) The decisions solve the maximization problems specified above; (ii) The
decisions are symmetric across all agents with the same preference shocks; (iii) The goods and bond
markets clear. The last part requires (2) and
nys + (1− n)
Z εH
0
yεdF (ε) = 0 (17)
to hold.
We now derive the symmetric stationary equilibrium allocation. In any symmetric equilibrium,
where money and bonds have positive values m0 = M and b0 = B. In a stationary equilibrium,
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using (11) and (13) we can write (16) as
γ − β (1 + i)
β (1 + i)
= (1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) . (18)
This is an equation in i and ε˜. We now derive a second equation i and ε˜ which we can then use to
define the equilibrium.
In any stationary equilibrium, a is constant so a = 1/ (1 + i) = ρ. We focus on equilibria
where the stocks of bonds B and money M grow at the same rate γ.15 We can then rewrite the
government budget constraint (5) to solve for 1 + i as a function of γ and M−1/B−1
1 + i =
γ
1− (γ − 1)M−1/B−1
(19)
Since B and M grow at the same rate, we have M−1/B−1 = M/B = M0/B0 for all t.16 A non-
negative nominal interest rate requires the denominator of (19) to be positive and the right-hand
side of (19) to be greater than or equal to 1. This requires B0/M0 + 1 > γ ≥ 1. Thus, for a
given ratio of nominal outside bonds to outside money, the range of feasible γ is bounded by this
expression. Define γ¯ ≡ 1 +B0/M0. If γ = 1, then i = 0. Substitute (19) into (11) and (18) to get
ε˜u0(q˜) =
γ
1− (γ − 1)M0/B0
(20)
1− (γ − 1)M0/B0 = β
∙
(1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) + 1
¸
(21)
For given values of γ and M0/B0, the second equation pins down ε˜. The first equation then
yields q˜. Given q˜ and ε˜, we can then solve for all endogenous quantities and prices.
Definition 1 A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium is an ε˜ that satisfies (21).
In what follows we define γH ≡ 1 + (1− β)B0/M0 < γ¯.
Proposition 1 For 1 ≤ γ < γ¯, a unique symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium exists. If
γ ≤ γH , then ε˜ ∈ (0, εH ]. If γH < γ < γ¯, then ε˜ > εH .
15We have also explored the case where bonds and money grow at diﬀerent rates. In this case a stationary
equilibrium requires lump-sum injections of money in each period. The real allocations that can be attained are the
same as the allocations when money and bonds grow at the same rates.
16Since the assets are nominal objects, the government can start the economy oﬀ by one-time injections of cash
M0 and bonds B0 to obtain the desired ratio of M0/B0.
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The essence of this proposition is that for suﬃciently low inflation rates, high ε buyers will face
binding bond sale constraints, and so εu0(qε) > 1 + i. In contrast, for suﬃciently high inflation
rates, no buyers face binding bond sales constraints, implying εu0(qε) = 1 + i for all ε, and from
(21) we have 1− (γ − 1)M0/B0 = β. Then, from (19), we obtain the Fisher equation
i =
γ − β
β
. (22)
3.2 Optimal policy
There are two ineﬃciencies in this economy that policy must try to overcome. First, when ε˜ < εH ,
there is an ineﬃcient allocation of consumption across buyers since some buyers are constrained
while others are not. As a result, the marginal utilities of consumption are not equalized. This
is an extensive margin ineﬃciency. Second, due to the time cost of holding money, the quantities
consumed by all buyers are ineﬃciently low if γ > β. This is an intensive margin ineﬃciency.
Keeping in mind these two ineﬃciencies, we now state the optimal policy in the outside bond
economy.
Proposition 2 The optimal policy is to set γ = 1 + (1− β)B0/M0 and then let B0/M0 → 0.
Under this policy, the limiting allocation satisfies ε˜ = εH and
εu0 (qε) = 1/β ∀ε. (23)
According to Proposition 2, the optimal policy makes ε˜ = εH which equalizes the marginal
utility of consumption across all buyers. This requires that the left-hand side of (21) equals β.
Then, using this expression and (20), we get
εu0 (qε) = γ/β ∀ε.
The optimal policy then requires that γ be as small as possible, yet kept above 1. This can be
achieved by letting B0 → 0, implying γ is arbitrarily close to one. The intuition for this result is
that the government needs to print money to redeem bonds. This generates inflation which has a
negative intensive margin eﬀect. By reducing the bonds/money ratio, the amount of newly printed
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money can be reduced while still providing a second asset for portfolio reallocation. In the limit,
the nominal interest rate approaches the real interest rate and the inflation rate goes to zero.17
One might ask: How can illiquid bonds raise consumption and welfare even though the quantity
in the limiting case approaches zero? The key to understand this is that the presence of interest-
bearing bonds raises the demand for money and hence its value. They increase the value of money
because they allow agents, on the margin, to trade idle cash for an interest-bearing asset. Higher
valued money allows agents to consume more thereby improving the allocation. Note that this
reasoning is valid for any strictly positive stock of bonds in the economy. The size of the nominal
bond stock is not relevant for an agent’s marginal decision — all that matters is some bonds exist.
An implication of this result is that there is a discrete jump in the allocation at B = 0, since
without bonds consumption and welfare strictly lower than in the limiting equilibrium B → 0. This
is similar to the discrete jump that occurs in monetary models where money serves as a medium of
exchange (e.g. Lagos and Wright (2005)). Ignoring barter, if M = 0 the equilibrium allocation is
autarky since no trade occurs. For any M > 0, however small, the monetary equilibrium allocation
strictly dominates the autarky allocation. Here, if B = 0, there is no other asset and so the
allocation equals the allocation in a model where money is the only asset. If we introduce a stock
of interest bearing bonds B > 0, however small, we also get a discrete jump of the allocation if B
is not too large.
Figure 1 displays some properties of our model. It displays steady-state welfare in the economy
with illiquid bonds as a function of inflation γ for several values of the bonds/money ratio. At γ = 1
all welfare levels are equal. The dots correspond to the inflation rates at which the economy switches
from being constrained to unconstrained. One can see that moderate inflation rates are welfare
improving if the ratio B0/M0 is suﬃciently small. For large values of B0/M0 (e.g. B0/M0 = 10
in Figure 1) it is not welfare improving. For higher values (e.g. B0/M0 = 2.5) some inflation is
beneficial. In this example, the dots for B0/M0 = 0.625, 1.25, 2.5 also correspond to the optimal
inflation rate for each economy. It is evident that increasing the ratio B0/M0 is never welfare
increasing. The optimal limiting policy corresponds to dot labelled B0/M0 = 0 at γ = 1.18
17Notice that for any B ≥ 0 the set of equilibrium allocations is continuous in the rate of inflation.
18Figure 1 is drawn for the utility function u (q) = (1− α)−1 q1−α with α = 0.5. We also used a uniform distribution
of preference shocks on [0, 2] and set the measure of buyers to n = 0.5 and the discount factor to β = 0.95. We will
use the same specification in all figures that follow.
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Note that the welfare enhancing-role of illiquid bonds requires a strictly positive nominal interest
rate and strictly positive rate of inflation. The reason is that if an agent brings in money and does
not need it, he can trade it for an interest-bearing asset that compensates him for bringing ‘idle’
money into market 1. This increases the demand for money in market 3 and thus its real value. As
a result, there is higher expected consumption in market 2. Thus, illiquid bonds will improve the
allocation if i > 0. However, i > 0 requires that γ > 1.
Finally, suppose now that instead of book-keeping entries, bonds are tangible objects that can
be used as a medium of exchange in market 2, i.e., they are liquid. One can show that in this
environment, the allocation is the same as the allocation without bonds. The intuition and proof
for this result is straightforward and provided in Kocherlakota (2003, p. 184): "If bonds are as
liquid as money, then people will only hold money if nominal interest rates are zero. But then the
bonds can just be replaced by money: there is no diﬀerence between the two instruments at all."
An interesting implication of this result is that "any essentiality of nominal bonds can be traced
directly to their (relative) illiquidity (Kocherlakota 2003, p. 184)."19 The same observation is also
stated by Hellwig (1993 p. 219) as follows: "if there is an asset whose own rate of return exceeds
19Alternatively, if nominal bonds are liquid and i > 0, then the real value of fiat money goes to zero. But since
interest on nominal bonds is paid out in units of fiat money, the real value of the interest on bonds has to be zero as
well. It then follows that nominal bonds can never be sold at a discount, so i = 0 is the only equilibrium.
15
the own rate of return on money in each period with probability one and if this asset has the
same marketability properties as fiat money, then there exists no rational expectations equilibrium
in which fiat money has a positive real value." Consequently, any model where money and bonds
coexist must reduce the marketability properties of bonds relative to fiat money.
4 Inside Bonds
In this section, we analyze the model where there are no outside bonds, but inside bonds can be
traded in market 1. In market 1, sellers and low ε buyers can use their idle cash balances to acquire
nominal bonds from the financial intermediary, which are redeemed in market 3. High ε buyers can
issue nominal bonds in market 1 to the financial intermediary and redeem them in market 3. Inside
bonds are perfectly divisible, and one inside bond pays oﬀ 1 unit of fiat currency in market 3. Let
bj denote the number of inside bonds purchased by an agent of type j = ε, s. When bj < 0, the
agent is borrowing and thus selling inside bonds. Let a denote the market 1 price of these inside
bonds. Again, we have a = (1 + i)−1.20
Again, we focus on symmetric and stationary equilibria where all agents follow identical strate-
gies and where real allocations are constant over time. In a stationary equilibrium, end-of-period
real money balances are time-invariant.
In the third market, the problem of a representative agent in period t is:
V (m, b) = max
x,h,m0,q0ε,q0s,b0ε,b0s
U (x)− h (24)
+β (1− n)
Z εH
0
£
εu(q0ε) + V
¡
m0 − a0b0ε − p0q0ε, b0ε
¢¤
dF (ε)
+βn
£
−q0s + V
¡
m0 − a0b0s + p0q0s, b0s
¢¤
subject to the sequence of constraints
x+ φm0 = h+ φm+ φbj
pqε ≤ m− abε 0 ≤ m− abj − b¯ ≤ bj .
20One period contracts are optimal here due to the quasi-linearity of preferences. In short, linearity of utility in
hours worked means there are no welfare gains from smoothing market 3 labor across time to repay current debt.
16
The first three constraints are as before. The last constraint is a borrowing constraint where −b¯ is
the bound on how many inside bonds can be issued. Although the agents take this constraint as
exogenous, in equilibrium it is endogenously determined.
As before, the solution to this problems yields (8), (9), (11), (13) and (16). The replacements
for (12), (14) and (15) are given by
q˜ = φm+ φb¯/ (1 + i) (25)
bs ∈
£
−b¯,m (1 + i)
¤
if i = 0
bs = m (1 + i) if i > 0
(26)
bε ∈
£
−b¯,m (1 + i)
¤
if εu0(qε) = 1 + i
bε = −b¯ if εu0(qε) > 1 + i.
(27)
Now the critical buyer spends all of his cash and borrows the maximum but is indiﬀerent to
borrowing beyond that point. Buyers with ε ≤ ε˜, do not issue the maximal amount of inside
bonds, whereas borrowers with ε ≥ ε˜, issue the maximal amount of inside bonds and spend the
proceeds on goods.
4.1 Stationary equilibria
To derive the symmetric stationary equilibrium, we have to solve for the equilibrium quantities and
prices. In any symmetric equilibrium, m =M−1. As before (16) reduces to
γ − β (1 + i)
β (1 + i)
= (1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) . (28)
Comparing (28) to (18), we see that the cutoﬀ values and thus the allocations for the outside bond
and inside bond economies will be the same if the nominal interest rate in each economy is the
same. Hence, what needs to be determined is whether or not the nominal interest rates will diﬀer
across the two economies.
We now derive the value of b¯. Since b¯ is a nominal variable, what we really want is the real
value c¯ ≡ φb¯. This quantity is the maximal real amount that an agent is willing to repay in the last
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market. For buyers entering the last market with no money, who redeem their bonds, the expected
discounted utility in a steady state is given by (24). A defaulting buyer’s expected discounted
utility is
bV (m, b) = max
ex,ehε,em0,eq0ε,eq0s
U (bx)− bhε
+β (1− n)
Z εH
0
£
εu(bq0ε) + V ¡ bm0 − p0bq0ε, 0¢¤ dF (ε)
+βn
£
−bq0s + V ¡ bm0 + p0bq0s, 0¢¤
where the hat indicates the optimal choices by a defaulter. The real borrowing constraint makes
the agent indiﬀerent between redeeming his bonds or defaulting so that V (m, b) = bV (m, b).
When no enforcement exits, agents must voluntarily redeem their bonds. The only punishment
for default is permanent exclusion from the inside bond market. Let bqε denote the quantity pur-
chased by an agent with preference shock ε who is excluded from the inside bond market. It is
straightforward to show that the marginal value of money for a defaulter satisfies
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (bqε)− 1¤ dF (ε) (29)
while (28) continues to determine the value of money for a non-defaulter. Since an agent who
defaults can only use the money balances he brings into the period to buy goods, then there is a
critical value εˆ such that
εˆu0 (bq) = 1 (30)
His consumption is
bqε =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
q∗ε if ε ≤ εˆ
u0−1 (1/εˆ) if ε ≥ εˆ
(31)
which means that he consumes the first-best quantity q∗ε for ε ≤ εˆ and the same quantity u0−1 (1/εˆ)
for all ε ≥ εˆ. The remaining choices, bx and bhε are derived in the Appendix.
Real borrowing constraint Given a borrowing constraint, there are two possibilities: 1) The
borrowing constraint is non-binding for all agents or 2) It is binding for some agents. The following
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Lemma is used for the remainder of this section.
Lemma 1 The real borrowing constraint is
c¯ =
β
(1 + i) (1− β)
∙
(1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε) +µγ − ββ
¶
(qˆ −Q)
¸
(32)
where
Ψ (qε, qˆε) =
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)−
Z εH
0
[εu (qˆε)− qˆε] dF (ε) .
and Q is given by (2). We can now define a monetary equilibrium with inside bonds.
Definition 2 A monetary equilibrium with unconstrained borrowing is a set
©
qε, bqε, c¯, i, εˆ, ε˜ª sat-
isfying ε˜ ≥ εH , (13), (31), (32) and
0 < cH < c¯ (33)
γ − β
β
= i (34)
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
Z εH
εˆ
³ε
εˆ
− 1
´
dF (ε) (35)
Equation (34) is obtained by using εu0(qε) = 1 + i for all ε in (28) while (35) comes from
combining (29)-(31).
Definition 3 A monetary equilibrium with constrained borrowing is a set
©
qε, bqε, c¯, i, εˆ, ε˜ª satisfying
(13), (31), (32) and
c¯ = u0−1 [(1 + i) /ε˜]−Q (36)
γ − β (1 + i)
β (1 + i)
= (1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) (37)
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
Z εH
εˆ
³ε
εˆ
− 1
´
dF (ε) (38)
Since high ε buyers are credit constrained εu0(qε) = 1 + i does not hold for all ε and (34) no
longer holds. It is replaced by equation (36) which is obtained from using the cash constraint of a
credit constrained borrower.
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Proposition 3 For a value β¯, suﬃciently close to 1, if β ∈
£
β¯, 1
¢
, then there is an ıˆ > 0 such that:
(i) If i ≥ ıˆ, then a unique monetary equilibrium with unconstrained borrowing exists.
(ii) If 0 < i < ıˆ, then a monetary equilibrium with constrained borrowing may exist.
(iii) If i = 0 a unique monetary equilibrium without borrowing exists.
Since i = 0 at γ = 1, inside bonds are not traded and the allocation is the same as the illiquid
outside bonds allocation at i = 0 at γ = 1.
4.2 Optimal policy
In an unconstrained borrowing equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that inflation is always
welfare reducing since it reduces the real value of money balances and consumption for all agents.
However, in a constrained borrowing equilibrium, it may be optimal for the government to set
γ > 1. As was the case with outside bonds, at γ = 1 and i = 0, some buyers consume their first-
best quantities while others do not. Consequently, there is a first-order welfare gain from moving
some consumption from those buyers at their first-best quantities to those who are not. In addition
to this welfare gain, there is another positive welfare eﬀect from raising γ above 1 — it increases
the cost of being excluded from the banking system. Since a defaulter carries more money, he pays
a higher inflation tax from using cash. By increasing γ, the punishment for defaulting increases.
This relaxes the borrowing constraint and creates a first-order welfare gain. However, the higher
inflation reduces real money balances and expected consumption, which lowers welfare.21 We can
thus state the following:
Proposition 4 In a constrained borrowing equilibrium, if β >
h
1 + n+ (1− n)
R ε˜
0 dF (ε˜)
i−1
, then
a positive steady state inflation rate maximizes welfare ∀ε˜.
Proposition 4 states that the optimal inflation rate is strictly positive if agents are suﬃciently
patient.
21Berentsen Camera and Waller (2007) show that for a degenerate distribution for ε, inflation is always welfare-
increasing for suﬃciently high values of β. In this section, we extend those results to the case of a non-degenerate
distribution of ε.
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5 Inside vs outside bonds
In what follows, we compare the economy with inside bonds to the one with outside bonds. For
this comparison, two facts are key. First, at γ = 1, the allocations in both economies are the
same. Second, for suﬃciently high inflation rates, (22) and (34) are the same so the allocation in
an unconstrained borrowing equilibrium is the same as the illiquid outside bond allocation when γ
is suﬃciently high. Thus, diﬀerences arise for low inflation rates only.
Proposition 5 Given an equilibrium in the inside bond economy, it is possible to pick policy in
the outside bond economy that generates an outcome-equivalent equilibrium. The converse is not
true.
The proof of Proposition 5 is as follows. Consider any allocation in the economy with inside
bonds for some γI . This allocation is characterized by some interest rate, say iI . Choose the same
inflation γ = γI for the economy with outside bonds and some ratio B/M . From (19), this yields
some interest rate i. Then, by changing B/M , one can attain the same interest rate i = iI as in
the inside bonds economy. Since γ and i are the same in both economies, from (18) and (37), the
cutoﬀ values ε˜ are also the same. It then follows that all quantities qε are the same. The converse
is not true, since there are allocations in the outside bonds that cannot be attained in the inside
bonds economy.
Corollary 1 Under the optimal policies, the allocation with outside bonds Pareto-dominates the
inside bond allocation.
Corollary 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. The dashed green line plots steady-state welfare in the
outside bonds economy for diﬀerent values B0/M0 when in each case γ is chosen optimally. The
solid line plots welfare in the inside bonds economy. It is clear that when borrowing constraints are
binding (i.e., when γ < γ˜), welfare is strictly lower than in the outside bond economy.
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What is the intuition for this result? In the inside bond economy, there is only one instrument,
γ, to solve two ineﬃciencies — the time cost of holding money (the intensive margin) and the
distribution of consumption across agents (extensive margin). Furthermore, γ aﬀects the individual
decisions to default. In the outside bond economy, the government has two instruments, γ and
M0/B0, to deal with two ineﬃciencies. However, the key is that individual default is not an issue.
In the following section, we show that when enforcement is feasible the allocations are equivalent.
5.1 Enforcement
We now depart from one of our main assumptions that all trades must be voluntary. In particular,
we assume that in the inside bonds economy redemption of inside bonds can be forced on agents and
that the government has access to lump-sum taxes. This allows us to state an equivalence result.
When redemption can be forced in the inside bond economy, default is not feasible and so there is
no borrowing constraints. It is then straightforward to show that in a stationary equilibrium the
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interest rate and all of the quantities qε are determined by22
γ − β
β
= i (39)
εu0 (qε) = 1 + i (40)
The first equation comes from the agent’s decision of how much money to bring into the period. In
equilibrium they are indiﬀerent between acquiring an additional unit of money in the centralized
market or borrowing it in the inside bond market. The second equation comes from the buyers’
decisions of how much to borrow.
In the Appendix we prove the following
Proposition 6 Assume enforcement is feasible. Then, given an equilibrium in one of these economies,
it is possible to pick policy in the other economy that generates an outcome-equivalent equilibrium.
The proof involves showing that if the government can use lump-sum taxes to finance the interest
rate on the outstanding stock of bonds, then in a stationary equilibrium the interest rate and all
of the quantities qε are also determined by (39) and (40). The intuition is that these lump-sum
taxes decuple the government’s decision of which i to oﬀer from its decision of which γ to choose.
To replicate the allocation of the inside bonds economy for a given γ it simply sets i = (γ − β) /β.
With this policy no buyer is constraint in the bonds market and so εu0 (qε) = 1 + i for all ε.
This shows that the key friction responsible for the diﬀerent allocations at low inflation rates
is the lack of enforcement. The proposition is related to the findings of Kocherlakota (2007). The
diﬀerence is that in our model money has an essential role in transactions while in Kocherlakota
money is not a medium of exchange. Finally, note that with enforcement the Friedman rule γ = β
is optimal in both economies.
6 Conclusion
When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist to relax this constraint: sell assets or issue
debt. We have analyzed and compared the welfare properties of these two options in a model where
agents can either issue nominal inside bonds or sell nominal outside bonds. The key assumption of
22See Berentsen Camera and Waller (2007) for the derivation.
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our analysis is the absence of collection powers by private agents and the government. The following
results emerged from our analysis. First, for any positive inflation rate, bonds are essential in both
economies, and thus generate societal benefits. Second, we showed that for suﬃciently high inflation
rates, the allocations in the two economies are the same, but they diﬀer for low inflation rates.
Third, any allocation attained in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy
with outside bonds. The converse is not true. Finally, under the optimal policies, the optimal
allocation with illiquid outside bonds dominates the allocation with inside bonds. We also showed
that the key friction which is responsible for theses two mechanisms to yield diﬀerent allocations
is enforcement. If the private sector can enforce repayment of debt and if the government can levy
lump-sum taxes, then given an equilibrium in one of these economies, it is possible to pick policy
in the other economy that generates an outcome-equivalent equilibrium.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider γ < γ¯. From (21) define
f (ε˜) ≡ (1− n) 1
ε˜
Z εH
ε˜
εdF (ε)− (1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
dF (ε) .
We have f 0 (ε˜) < 0 with limε˜→0 f (ε˜) = +∞ and f (εH) = 0. Consequently, if γ ≤ γH , then a
unique 0 < ε˜ ≤ εH solves (21). If γ¯ > γ > γH , we have ε˜ > εH and
qε = u0−1
µ
γ
ε [1 + (1− γ)M0/B0]
¶
for all ε.
Proof of Proposition 2. The policy choices are γ and B0/M0. However, for the proof it is more
convenient to define Θ ≡ 1− (γ − 1)M0/B0 and rewrite (20) and (21) as follows.
ε˜u0(q˜) =
1 + (1−Θ)B0/M0
Θ
(41)
Θ = β
∙
(1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) + 1
¸
(42)
In the following, we consider choices ofΘ andB0/M0. With this formulation, a change inB0/M0 has
no eﬀect on the extensive margin as (42) is independent of B0/M0.
We now show which values of Θ are consistent with an equilibrium where agents hold positive
amounts of bonds and money. From (41), any equilibrium requires that 1+(1−Θ)B0/M0Θ ≥ 1 implying
0 < Θ ≤ 1. From (42) we have β ≤ Θ since (1− n)
R εH
ε˜
¡ε
ε˜ − 1
¢
dF (ε) ≥ 0 in any equilibrium. The
admissible values are therefore β ≤ Θ ≤ 1.
The remainder of the proof involves two steps. We first show that for any admissible β ≤ Θ ≤ 1
it is optimal to let B0/M0 → 0. We then show that, if B0/M0 is suﬃciently small, it is optimal to
choose Θ = β.
First step. From (42), if Θ is constant then ε˜ is constant. Assume Θ = 1. Then, ε˜u0(q˜) = 1
and 1/β = (1− n)
R εH
ε˜
¡ε
ε˜ − 1
¢
dF (ε) + 1. In this case, B0/M0 has no eﬀect on the allocation. So
a best policy is to let B0/M0 → 0. Assume next β ≤ Θ < 1. Then, since ε˜ is constant, from (41),
dq˜/d (B0/M0) < 0, and so it is optimal to let B0/M0 → 0. Note that for B0/M0 → 0 we obtain
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ε˜u0(q˜) = 1/Θ ∈ [1, 1/β] and
Θ
β
=
∙
(1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) + 1
¸
∈ [1, 1/β] (43)
since β ≤ Θ ≤ 1.
Second step. Let us now assume that B0/M0 ∈ (0, ϕ] with ϕ → 0, i.e., small but strictly
positive. To choose Θ optimally, totally diﬀerentiate (41) and (42), while holding B0/M0 constant,
to get
1 + β (1− n) 1
ε˜Θ
Z εH
ε˜
εdF (ε)
dε˜
dΘ
Θ
ε˜
= 0
Substitute dε˜dΘ
Θ
ε˜ to get
1− 1
β (1− n) 1ε˜Θ
R εH
ε˜ εdF (ε)
+
B0/M0
ε˜u0(q˜)
= −u
00(q˜)q˜
u0(q˜)
dq˜
dΘ
Θ
q˜
Since u
00(q˜)q˜
u0(q˜) < 0,
dq˜
dΘ < 0 if the left-hand side is negative, i.e., if
(1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
(ε/ε˜) dF (ε)
∙
1 +
B0/M0
ε˜u0(q˜)
¸
< Θ/β
Use (42) to replace the right-hand side
(1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
ε
ε˜
dF (ε)
∙
ΘB0/M0
1 + (1−Θ)B0/M0
¸
< 1− (1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
dF (ε)
which is true for small B0/M0. We, therefore, have established that dq˜dΘ < 0 if B0/M0 is small.
Since dε˜dΘ < 0 and
dq˜
dΘ < 0, it is optimal to choose Θ = β.
The optimal policy is therefore to set γ = 1 + (1− β)B0/M0 and then let B0/M0 → 0. From
(20) and (21) this implies that ε˜u0(q˜) = 1/β and ε˜ = εH . Finally, from (13), we get εu0(qε) = 1/β
∀ε.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a borrower who borrowed −b¯ in market 1 and is considering
defaulting on his issued bonds in market 3. The real borrowing constraint c¯ = φb¯ satisfies V (m, b) =bV (m, b) . If he redeems his bonds, he gets the equilibrium expected discounted utility in a steady
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state
V (m, b) = U (x∗)− hε +
β
1− β
½Z εH
0
[(1− n) εu (qε)− nqs] dF (ε) + U (x∗)− h
¾
where hε is his production in market 3 if he repays his loan. Since bx = x∗ a defaulter’s expected
discounted utility is
bV (m, b) = U (bx)− bhε + β
1− β
½Z εH
0
[(1− n) εu (bqε)− nbqs] dF (ε) + U (x∗)− bh¾
It then follows that V (m, b) = bV (m, b) requires
hε − bhε = β
1− β
h
(1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε) + bh− hi . (44)
where Ψ (qε, bqε) = R εH0 [εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε) − R εH0 [εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε) > 0. We get this expression
for Ψ (qε, bqε), because sellers are indiﬀerent as to how much they produce and we, therefore, assume
that the deviator produces qˆs =
¡
1−n
n
¢ R εH
εL
bqεdF (ε) in the decentralized market in each period.
Furthermore, from market clearing we have nqs = (1− n)
R εH
0 qεdF (ε) .
Deriving hε − bhε: If the buyer redeems his bonds, he works
hε = x∗ + φm1,+1 − φ
£
m1 + b¯− pqε
¤
− φτM−1 + φb¯ (1 + i)
= x∗ + φm1,+1 − φ [m1 − pqε]− φτM−1 + φb¯i
= x∗ + qε + c¯i
where we use the equilibrium condition m1,+1 = m1 + τM−1 = γm1. If he defaults on his bonds,
he works
bhε = x∗ + φbm1,+1 − φ £m1 + b¯− pqε¤− φτM−1
= x∗ + φ (bm1,+1 −m1,+1)− c¯+ qε
= x∗ + φγ (bm1 −m1)− c¯+ qε
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where we use the fact that a defaulter’s money balances grows at the rate γ so bm1,+1 = γ bm1. Thus
hε − bhε = (1 + i) c¯− φγ (bm1 −m1) (45)
Deriving bh− h: Once the agent defaults, as a buyer he spent pbqε units of money so his hours
worked are
bhε = x∗ + φmˆ1,+1 − φ (bm1 − pbqε)− φτM−1
= x∗ + φ (bm1,+1 − bm1) + φpbqε − φ (m1,+1 −m1)
= x∗ + (γ − 1)φ (bm1 −m1) + φpbqε
For a seller, we have
bhs = x∗ + φbm1,+1 − φ (bm1 + pbqs)− φτM−1
= x∗ + (γ − 1)φ (bm1 −m1)− φpµ1− nn
¶Z εH
0
bqεdF (ε)
A defaulter’s expected hours worked are therefore
bh = (1− n)bhε + nbhs = x∗ + (γ − 1)φ (bm1 −m1)
while, if he does not deviate, he works h = x∗ and so
bh− h = (γ − 1)φ (bm1 −m1) (46)
Solving for c¯: Using (44)-(46) we get
c¯ =
β
(1− β) (1 + i)
∙
(1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε) +µγ − ββ
¶
(φbm1 − φm1)¸
In equilibrium φbm1 = bq, and using market clearing φm1 = φM−1 = Q ≡ (1− n) R εH0 qεdF (ε). So
we have
c¯ =
β
(1− β) (1 + i)
∙
(1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε) +µγ − ββ
¶
(bq −Q)¸
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To know whether c¯ > 0, we need to determine the sign of right-hand side. Substituting for Ψ (qε, bqε)
and Q we need
(1− n)
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)− (1− n)
Z εH
0
[εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε)+µ
γ − β
β
¶ ∙bq − (1− n)Z εH
0
qεdF (ε)
¸
> 0
We have
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (bqε)− 1¤ dF (ε) (47)
Substituting the right-hand side, we get
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)−
Z εH
0
[εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε)
+
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (bqε)− 1¤ dF (ε) ∙bq − (1− n)Z εH
0
qεdF (ε)
¸
> 0
In an unconstrained borrowing equilibrium we have
γ − β
β
=
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤
dF (ε) (48)
So (47) and (48) yield
1− n =
R εH
0 [εu
0 (qε)− 1] dF (ε)R εH
0 [εu
0 (bqε)− 1] dF (ε) < 1
Substitute this in
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)−
Z εH
0
[εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε)
+
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (bqε)− 1¤ dF (ε) ∙bq − R εH0 [εu0 (qε)− 1] dF (ε)R εH
0 [εu
0 (bqε)− 1] dF (ε)
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε)
¸
> 0
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)−
Z εH
0
[εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε)
+bq Z εH
0
£
εu0 (bqε)− 1¤ dF (ε)− Z εH
0
qεdF (ε)
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤
dF (ε) > 0
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Rewrite as
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)−
Z εH
0
[εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε)
>
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε)
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤
dF (ε)− bq Z εH
0
£
εu0 (bqε)− 1¤ dF (ε)
Divide both sides by
R εH
0 qεdF (ε)−
R εH
0 bqεdF (ε) to getR εH
0 [εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε)−
R εH
0 [εu (bqε)− bqε] dF (ε)R εH
0 qεdF (ε)−
R εH
0 bqεdF (ε)
>
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤
dF (ε)
R εH
0 qεdF (ε)− bq U εH0 [εu0(eqε)−1]dF (ε)U εH
0 [εu0(qε)−1]dF (ε)R εH
0 qεdF (ε)−
R εH
0 bqεdF (ε)
which always holds because the LHS is greater than
R εH
0 [εu
0 (qε)− 1] dF (ε) and
R εH
0 qεdF (ε)− bq U εH0 [εu0(eqε)−1]dF (ε)U εH
0 [εu0(qε)−1]dF (ε)R εH
0 qεdF (ε)−
R εH
0 bqεdF (ε) < 1
So c¯ > 0 in an unconstrained equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. In an unconstrained equilibrium we have unique values for qε and
i = (γ − β) /β. All that is left is to show that cH ≤ c¯ or
cH ≤
β
(1− β) (1 + i) (1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε) + βi (bq −Q)(1− β) (1 + i)
Since all agents (including the one with εH) are unconstrained, we have cH = qεH − φM−1 and
φM−1 = Q so that we have
(1− β) (1 + i) (qεH −Q) ≤ β (1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε) + iβ (bq −Q) (49)
Define
∆ (i, β) ≡ (1− β) (1 + i) (qεH −Q)− β (1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε)− iβ (bq −Q)
So we need∆ (i, β) ≤ 0 in an unconstrained borrowing equilibrium. Note that∆ (0, β) = (1− β)
¡
q∗εH −Q
∗¢ >
0, since Ψ (q∗ε , bq∗ε) = 0 at i = 0. Thus, (49) is violated at the Friedman rule.
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Consider solutions to ∆ (i, β) = 0. Note that ∆(0, 1) = 0, since qε|(0,1) = bqε|(0,1) = q∗ε and
Ψ (q∗ε , bq∗ε) = 0. Let ∆i (i, β) ≡ ∂∆(i,β)∂i . Then, we have
∆i (i, β) = (1− β) (qεH −Q) + (1− β) (1 + i)
µ
∂qεH
∂i
− ∂Q
∂i
¶
−β (1− n) ∂Ψ (qε, bqε)
∂i
− β (bq −Q)− βiµ∂bq
∂i
− ∂Q
∂i
¶
Since the partial derivatives in this expression are all continuous, ∆i (i, β) is continuous and non-
zero with
∆i (0, 1) = −β (bq −Q)|(0,1) = − ∙q∗εH − (1− n)Z εH
0
q∗εdF (ε)
¸
< 0.
since ∂Ψ(qε,eqε)∂i
¯¯¯
(0,1)
= 0 and bq|(0,1) = q∗εH .
Let ∆β (i, β) ≡ ∂∆(i,β)∂β . Then, we have
∆β (i, β) = −(1 + i) (qεH −Q) + (1− β) (1 + i)
µ
∂qεH
∂β
− ∂Q
∂β
¶
− (1− n)Ψ (qε, bqε)− β (1− n) ∂Ψ (qε, bqε)∂β − i (bq −Q)− iβ
µ
∂bq
∂β
− ∂Q
∂β
¶
Therefore ∆β (0, 1) is continuous and
∆β (0, 1) = −
∙
q∗εH − (1− n)
Z εH
0
q∗εdF (ε)
¸
< 0.
since ∂Ψ(qε,eqε)∂β
¯¯¯
(0,1)
= 0. By the implicit function theorem, it follows that, for β arbitrarily close to
1, the expression ∆(i, β) = 0 defines i as an implicit function of β, i.e., i = ıˆ(β).
Furthermore, we have
di
dβ
¯¯¯¯
(0,1)
= −∆β (0, 1)
∆i (0, 1)
= −1,
so that as β falls, i grows. It follows from the implicit function theorem that ∆(ˆı, β) = 0 for a
unique ıˆ > 0, and β suﬃciently close to 1.
Establishing the existence and uniqueness of the unconstrained credit equilibrium for i > ıˆ.
Above, we established that ∆ (0, β) > 0 for all 0 < β < 1. Fix β close to 1. We have established
that ∆ (ˆı, β) = 0 for some ıˆ > 0. By continuity of ∆ (ˆı, β), if i > ıˆ, then ∆ (0, β) < 0, and so
an unconstrained equilibrium exists. For 0 ≤ i < ıˆ, then ∆ (i, β) ≥ 0 which violates (49). This
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establishes the first part of Proposition 3.
Consider 0 ≤ i < ıˆ. In general, we cannot prove existence or uniqueness. We now characterize
the properties of (32) and (36)-(38). At i = 0, (37)-(38) imply ε˜ = εˆ so q˜ = bq and Ψ (qε, bqε) = 0.
Then from (32) and (36) we have γ = 1. This implies there is one and only one monetary policy
consistent with a nominal interest rate of zero and also satisfies (36). Thus, a monetary equilibrium
with credit does not exist at γ = 1.
Furthermore, we have
di
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
=
1
1− β > 0 (50)
To obtain this, use (36) to replace c¯ in (32) and then totally diﬀerentiate the resulting expression:
(q˜ −Q) (1 + i) = β (1− n)
1− β Ψ (qε, bqε) +
µ
γ − β
1− β
¶
(bq −Q)
(1 + i) (dq˜ − dQ) + (q˜ −Q) di
=
β (1− n)
1− β
½∙Z εH
0
εu0 (qε) dqε − dqε
¸
dF (ε)−
∙Z εH
0
εu0 (qˆε) dbqε − dbqε¸ dF (ε)¾
+
β
1− β
∙µ
γ − β
β
¶
(dbq − dQ) + 1
β
(bq −Q) dγ¸
Evaluate at i = 0 and γ = 1 to get
(dq˜ − dQ) + (q˜ −Q) di
=
β (1− n)
1− β
½∙Z εH
ε˜
εu0 (qε)− 1
¸
dF (ε) dq˜ −
∙Z εH
εˆ
εu0 (qˆε)− 1
¸
dF (ε) dbq¾
+
β
1− β
∙µ
γ − β
β
¶
(dbq − dQ) + 1
β
(bq −Q) dγ¸
Note
£R εH
ε˜ εu
0 (qε)− 1
¤
dF (ε) =
£R εH
εˆ εu
0 (qˆε)− 1
¤
dF (ε) = 1−ββ and use q˜ = bq and (37)-(38) to get
dq˜ − dQ+ (bq −Q) di = β
1− β
µ
1− β
β
dq˜ − 1− β
β
dbq¶
+
β
1− β
∙µ
1− β
β
¶
(dbq − dQ) + 1
β
(bq −Q) dγ¸
This expression reduces to (50).
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Proof of Proposition 4. In equilibrium, welfare is given by (1). Again, using (2) diﬀerentiate
(1) with respect to γ to get
(1− β) dW
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
= (1− n)
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤ dqε
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
dF (ε) > 0.
Since εu0 (qε)− 1 = 0 for all ε ≤ ε˜ at γ = 1, and qε = q˜ for all ε ≥ ε˜, welfare will be increasing in γ
if dq˜dγ
¯¯¯
γ=1
> 0.
Using εu0 (qε) = 1 + i for all ε ≤ ε˜ and qε = q˜ for all ε ≥ ε˜ (28) can be written as
γ − β
β
= (1− n)u0 (q˜)
Z εH
ε˜
εdF (ε) + (1− n) (1 + i)
Z ε˜
0
dF (ε)− 1 + n+ ni (51)
Totally diﬀerentiate (51):
1
β
dγ = (1− n)u00 (q˜) dq˜
Z εH
ε˜
εdF (ε)− (1− n)
£
ε˜u0 (q˜)− (1 + i)
¤
dF (ε˜) dε˜
+
∙
n+ (1− n)
Z ε˜
0
dF (ε)
¸
di
Using ε˜u0 (q˜) = 1 + i, we have
1
β
dγ = (1− n)u00 (q˜) dq˜
Z εH
ε˜
εdF (ε) +
∙
n+ (1− n)
Z ε˜
0
dF (ε)
¸
di (52)
Substituting (50) into (52) gives
1
β
dγ =
∙
(1− n)u00 (q˜)
Z εH
ε˜
εdF (ε)
¸
dq˜ +
∙
n+ (1− n)
Z ε˜
0
dF (ε)
¸
1
1− βdγ
Thus
dq˜
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=1
=
1− β − β
h
n+ (1− n)
R ε˜
0 dF (ε)
i
β (1− β) (1− n)u00 (q˜)
R εH
ε˜ εdF (ε)
The denominator is negative. So dq˜dγ
¯¯¯
γ=1
> 0 and (1− β) dWdγ
¯¯¯
γ=1
> 0 if
β >
1
1 + n+ (1− n)
R ε˜
0 dF (ε)
.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the government finances interest rate payment on its out-
standing stock of bonds through lump-sum taxes. Then, (4) reduces to
Mt −Mt−1 = τ tMt−1
Then, it is straightforward to show that (18) continues to hold which we replicate here for easier
comparison:
γ − β (1 + i)
β (1 + i)
= (1− n)
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) .
Then, by choosing i = (γ − β) /β we get ε˜ = εH and so no buyer in constraint in the bonds market
implying that εu0 (qε) = 1 + i for all ε. This policy replicates (39) and (40).
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